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THE IMPACT OF INTERIOR IMMIGRATION 
ENFORCEMENT ON MIXED-CITIZENSHIP 
FAMILIES 
MICHAEL J. SULLIVAN* 
ROGER ENRIQUEZ** 
Abstract: In this article we trace the expansion of interior immigration enforce-
ment measures since the 1990s, focusing on the period after the creation of the 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2003. We consider the rationale 
for the escalation of enforcement during this period, as well as the expansion of 
enforcement to include local and state law enforcement agencies. Detailing in 
particular the role of local jails, private corrections corporations, and the commu-
nities that are financially dependent on the prison industry, the article also exam-
ines who benefits economically and politically from these changes. Throughout, 
we consider how the expansion of immigration enforcement has affected U.S. 
citizen children and spouses of unauthorized immigrants. We question whether 
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is fulfilling its mandate to de-
emphasize enforcement against parents, guardians, and children given that the 
number of detentions and removals in these categories continues to increase. We 
discuss how this is imposing unnecessary costs and burdens on ICE’s citizen 
stakeholders while benefiting private corrections corporations. 
INTRODUCTION 
On average, there are over 33,000 men and women separated from their 
families and housed in immigration detention facilities in the United States.1 
Most of these facilities receive scant attention because of their remote locales. 
Typically, for-profit corrections corporations prefer to locate their detention 
facilities away from populous areas in smaller, economically depressed cities 
and towns that are in need of development. Such privately run facilities are 
found in towns throughout South Texas such as La Villa, Karnes City, Encinal, 
Los Fresnos, Val Verde, Falfurrias, Robstown, and Raymondville. Many of the 
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men and women removed to for-profit facilities in South Texas are fathers and 
mothers of citizen-children who, prior to detention, resided in urban areas as 
far away as Atlanta and Chicago. The distances to family members, including 
their U.S. born children, are so great that communication is all but impossible.2 
In the absence of meaningful assistance from lawyers, family, and com-
munity members, many detainees opt for voluntary departure.3 In fiscal year 
2011, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) apprehended 641,633 per-
sons and, of those, 323,542, or 50.4%, opted for voluntary departure.4 These 
cases are hastily dispatched by an immigration judge with the predictable re-
sult of removal. In the end, families are separated and children are left without 
their parents. 
A U.S. born child gains citizenship at birth. However, the unauthorized 
immigrant parents of a U.S. citizen child can still be deported. As of 2012, the 
Pew Hispanic Center estimates that 4.5 million children born in the United 
States are in a mixed-citizenship status family, many with a parent who is a 
long-term resident of the United States but who does not have authorization to 
remain in the country.5 These citizen-children, or other dependents that are in 
this situation, have no right to sponsor their non-citizen parents to remain in or 
to return to the United States through ordinary channels.6 
 The Obama Administration has provided citizen children with one poten-
tial option that may allow them to stay with their non-citizen parents. On No-
vember 20, 2014, the Obama Administration instituted a new Deferred Action 
for Parental Accountability (DAPA) initiative, allowing certain parents of U.S. 
citizen or legal permanent resident children who have continually resided in 
the United States since January 1, 2010 to apply for a temporary reprieve from 
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See id. at 2. This is unlike other family members who may have to wait years or decades for a visa 
number to become available. See id. 
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deportation.7 This is an important development in immigration policy that may 
have the potential to provide mixed-citizenship status families with unauthor-
ized parents temporary relief from the fear that they could be deported at any 
time.  
However, as the Secretary of DHS, Jeh Johnson, noted in a subsequent 
memorandum, deferred action is a temporary reprieve that “may be terminated 
at any time at the agency’s discretion.”8 Further, the fragility of Obama’s Im-
migration Executive Actions was underscored by U.S. District Court Judge 
Andrew Hanen in a February 16, 2015 injunction that placed the deferred ac-
tion program for parents on hold pending the resolution of a court challenge by 
twenty-six states.9 On May 26, 2015, a divided panel of the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit denied the government’s motion to stay and limit the 
scope of Judge Hanen’s injunction.10 Furthermore, a future president could 
repeal the broader Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program, 
allowing for the removal of DACA applicants from the country. In light of 
these limitations, the United States Citizenship and Immigration Service 
(USCIS) reminded applicants in June of 2015 that only Congress can enact the 
necessary immigration reforms that would lead to a pathway to legal perma-
nent residence and citizenship for the deportable parents of citizen-children in 
mixed-status families.11 
The only remaining avenue that a mixed-legal status family with non-
citizen parents and citizen-children has to permanently remain together in the 
United States is to risk almost certain deportation by entering into “relief from 
removal” proceedings. If the non-citizen parent is discovered by immigration 
enforcement personnel and placed in removal proceedings, she can file for relief 
from removal if she has been in the country for more than ten years and she can 
demonstrate that her children stand to suffer “exceptional and extremely unusual 
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 11 See U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Serv., Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood 
Arrivals Process, Frequently Asked Questions (Jun. 15, 2015), http://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/
consideration-deferred-action-childhood-arrivals-process/frequently-asked-questions [http://perma.cc/
22CW-73A5]. 
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hardship” if she is deported.12 Unlike the family-based immigration admissions 
process that is initiated by an adult citizen or lawful permanent resident, very 
few applicants ever gain the right to lawfully remain in the United States with 
their families.13 Parents are deported even if this means that their citizen-children 
will experience the hardship of either having to leave their country of upbringing 
to stay with their parents, or having to stay in foster care to remain in the United 
States.14 Some parents do not even have the choice of taking their children with 
them because family courts are declaring unauthorized immigrant parents unfit 
based solely on their immigration status.15 
DHS has consistently insisted that its priority for interior immigration en-
forcement is to arrest, detain, and remove criminal and fugitive aliens who 
constitute a threat to national security and/or the welfare of American communi-
ties.16 Through a failure of oversight, and out of political pressure to produce 
results, federal enforcement officers and their local and state law enforcement 
partners have been targeting unauthorized immigrants without regard to their 
risk profile. This has led to residential raids in which long-term resident mi-
grants have been separated from their families, disrupting the lives of other-
wise law-abiding migrants and their citizen dependents alike. Under the 
Obama Administration, a larger percentage of the total number of detainees 
and deportees are non-citizens who committed a previous criminal offense.17 
But with a record number of non-citizens deported every year since 2009, or-
dinary status violators still make up an increasing number of the total number 
of detainees and deportees.18 
In this article, we will trace the expansion of interior immigration en-
forcement measures since the 1990s, focusing on the period after the creation 
of the DHS in 2003. We will consider the rationale for escalation of enforce-
ment and its expansion to include local and state law enforcement agencies 
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 13 See In re Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 I. & N. Dec. 56, 58–59 (B.I.A. 2001); Sunny Harris Rome, 
Promoting Family Integrity: The Child Citizen Protection Act and Its Implications for Public Child 
Welfare, 4 J. PUB. CHILD WELFARE 245, 249 (2010). Although 4.5 million citizen-children have an 
unauthorized immigrant parent, only 4000 parents are statutorily eligible for cancellation of removal 
based on “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to the child. See Rome, supra, at 249. 
 14 See Oforji v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 609, 617 (7th Cir. 2003); Acosta v. Gaffney, 558 F.2d 1153, 
1157 (3d Cir. 1977); Coleman v. United States, 454 F. Supp. 2d 757, 767–68 (N.D. Ill. 2006). 
 15 C. Elizabeth Hall, Note, Where Are My Children . . . And My Rights? Parental Rights 
Termination as a Consequence of Deportation, 60 DUKE L.J. 1459, 1460–62 (2011). 
 16 See SIMANSKI & SAPP, supra note 4, at 1; Obama, supra note 7. 
 17 See SIMANSKI & SAPP, supra note 4, at 1. In Fiscal Year 2011, the Department of Homeland 
Security Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detained a record-high 429,000 foreign nation-
als. Id. Additionally, ICE removed an all-time high of 188,000 known criminal aliens from the United 
States. Id. 
 18 See id. at 4. “The number of removals increased from 385,100 in 2010 to 391,953 in 2011.” Id. 
(explaining the increase in the number of total removals from the United States). 
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during this period. We will examine who benefits economically and politically, 
detailing the role of local jails, private corrections corporations, and the com-
munities that are financially dependent on the prison industry. Throughout, we 
will consider how the expansion of immigration enforcement has had collateral 
consequences on U.S. citizens, particularly the citizen children and spouses of 
non-citizens who are being detained and deported en masse with the expansion 
of interior immigration enforcement since 2003. 
I. HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
For most of the twentieth century, most migrants who traveled to the 
United States were content to return to a country and community of origin that 
they still regarded as home. Their partners (usually their wife) and children 
remained in the country of origin, received remittance money, and expected 
their migrant family member (usually husbands and fathers) to return. Their 
other important relationships of interdependence were rooted in their commu-
nities in their home countries and they had few ties in the United States beyond 
their workplace.19 This is still the case for many unauthorized immigrants who 
see themselves as guest workers and enter, make use of existing ties, develop 
new ones in the United States to earn money, and save or send the money 
home. However, there has always been a counter-narrative of settlement in the 
United States that prompted further network-based migration and the devel-
opment of far-reaching ties in adopted American communities. This trend ac-
celerated after Operation Hold the Line was initiated in 1994, which increased 
border enforcement that raised the costs and risks of seasonal migration. As a 
result, more migrants settled in the United States and sent for their families to 
join them.20 This led to a rapid increase in the unauthorized immigrant popula-
tion in the United States, from 5.7 million in 1995 to a peak of 12.2 million in 
2007.21 
As return migration became more difficult, adaptation and integration into 
U.S. communities became a greater priority among migrants who had previ-
ously been focused on returning home.22 The transition in migration that has 
                                                                                                                           
 19 See DEBORAH COHEN, BRACEROS: MIGRANT CITIZENS AND TRANSNATIONAL SUBJECTS IN 
THE POSTWAR UNITED STATES AND MEXICO 22–24 (2010). 
 20 See WAYNE A. CORNELIUS & JESSA M. LEWIS, IMPACTS OF BORDER ENFORCEMENT ON 
MEXICAN MIGRATION: THE VIEW FROM SENDING COMMUNITIES 1–6 (2007); DOUGLAS S. MASSEY, 
JORGE DURAND & NOLAN J. MALONE, BEYOND SMOKE AND MIRRORS: MEXICAN IMMIGRATION IN 
AN ERA OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 110, 136–37 (2002). 
 21 See JEFFREY S. PASSEL, D’VERA COHN & ANA GONZALEZ-BARRERA, PEW RES. CTR., 
POPULATION DECLINE OF UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANTS STALLS, MAY HAVE DECLINED: NEW 
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 22 See Jonathan Hicken, Mollie Cohen & Jorge Narvaez, Double Jeopardy: How U.S. 
Enforcement Policies Shape Tunkaseño Migration, in MEXICAN MIGRATION AND THE U.S. 
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brought spouses and entire families north, coupled with the necessity of set-
tlement in the face of more rigorous border enforcement, has increased the 
probability that migrants will give birth and/or raise their children in the Unit-
ed States. This trend is reflected in the number of children in the public school 
system with at least one undocumented parent, which was estimated at 6.8% of 
all kindergarten through twelfth grade students in the United States in 2008.23 
The growth in the settled unauthorized immigrant population in the Unit-
ed States was one of the factors that led to the enactment of the Illegal Immi-
gration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996.24 This measure 
made it considerably more difficult for unauthorized immigrant parents facing 
deportation to file for an appeal based on hardship to citizen-children. It also 
authorized the 287(g) agreements, which provide for cooperation between state 
and local law enforcement and federal immigration authorities.25 The first of 
these agreements was instituted in 2003 after the reorganization of the interior 
enforcement arm of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) into the 
Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). The 287(g) agree-
ments dramatically expanded the reach of immigration enforcement into local 
communities.  
These agreements later became a key component of a broader strategy of 
“attrition through enforcement” developed by legal scholar and Kansas Secre-
tary of State Kris Kobach as a model for both partnership-based immigration 
enforcement and state immigration ordinances, including Arizona’s Senate Bill 
1070 (SB 1070).26 Kobach argued that local and state police are essential to the 
success of “attrition through enforcement” as a strategy. Their role in the “attri-
tion through enforcement” strategy is to arrest suspected unauthorized immi-
grants within and beyond the parameters of a 287(g) agreement in order to 
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 24 See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–
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Daehoon Nahm & Massimiliano Tani, The Impact of the 1996 US Immigration Policy Reform 
(IIRIRA) on Mexican Migrants’ Remittances 5 (IZA Discussion Paper No. 6546, 2012).  
 25 See Immigration and Nationality Act § 287(g), 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2012). 
 26 See Luis B. Plascencia, Attrition Through Enforcement and the Elimination of a Dangerous 
Class, in LATINO POLITICS AND ARIZONA’S IMMIGRATION LAW SB 1070 93, 110 (Lisa Magaña & 
Erik Lee eds., 2013); Kris Kobach, Attrition Through Enforcement: A Rational Approach to Illegal 
Immigration, 15 TULSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 155, 161–62 (2007); JESSICA M. VAUGHAN, CTR. 
IMMIGR. STUD., ATTRITION THROUGH ENFORCEMENT: A COST EFFECTIVE STRATEGY TO SHRINK 
THE ILLEGAL ALIEN POPULATION 1, 9 (2006); infra notes 75–85 and accompanying text. Attrition 
through enforcement is a strategy in which law enforcement encourages aliens to depart the United 
States. Kobach, supra, at 156. The strategy involves “the risks of detention or involuntary employing 
[going] up, and the probability of being able to obtain unauthorized employment [going] down.” Id.  
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pressure their families and community members to self-deport and return to 
their countries of origin.27 Kobach views local and state law enforcement offi-
cials as “force multipliers” for ICE that can more effectively reach into local 
communities to target ordinary status violators.28 
Additionally, ICE’s new Office of Detention and Removal (DRO) drafted 
a new strategic plan, Operation Endgame, designed to “thwart and deter con-
tinued growth in the illegal alien population . . . ” by “[m]oving toward a 100% 
rate of removal for all removable aliens . . . .”29 To achieve this objective, the 
DRO established a quota of 1000 arrests of fugitive aliens per Fugitive Opera-
tions Team.30 This priority shift led to an increase in arrests of ordinary status 
violators as a percentage of total aliens apprehended by Fugitive Operation 
Teams from twenty-two percent from 2003 to 2005 to forty percent in 2007. 
Over the same period, the proportion of security threats and criminal non-
citizens diminished from thirty-two percent to nine percent of total arrests.31 
This shift in the operational mission of ICE’s National Fugitive Operations 
Program prompted Fugitive Operations Teams to conduct nighttime residential 
raids that involved breaking into homes and arresting everyone who could not 
prove that they were a U.S. citizen, causing parents to be separated from their 
citizen-children without any provision for the short-term care and long-term 
custody of the children. The number of parents separated from their citizen-
children during detention and removed from the United States increased with 
the expansion of these types of enforcement actions, including in particular 
home raids in Latino neighborhoods.32 
                                                                                                                           
 27 See Kris Kobach, Reinforcing the Rule of Law: What States and Localities Can and Should Do 
to Reduce Illegal Immigration, 22 GEO. IMMIGR. L. J. 459, 472, 478, 482 (2008). 
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to Make Immigration Arrests, 69 ALB. L. REV. 179, 234–35 (2005). 
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 31 See MARGOT MENDELSON, SHAYNA STROM & MICHAEL WISHNIE, MIGRATION POL’Y INST., 
COLLATERAL DAMAGE: AN EXAMINATION OF ICE’S FUGITIVE OPERATIONS PROGRAM 1–2 (2009). 
 32 See AJAY CHAUDRY ET AL., URB. INST., PAYING THE PRICE: THE IMPACT OF IMMIGRATION 
RAIDS ON AMERICA’S CHILDREN 11, 15–20 (2010); BESS CHIU ET AL., CONSTITUTION ON ICE: A 
REPORT ON IMMIGRATION HOME RAID OPERATIONS (2009), http://cw.routledge.com/textbooks/
9780415996945/human-rights/cardozo.pdf [http://perma.cc/L37T-GALE]; David Thronson, Creating 
Crisis: Immigration Raids and the Destabilization of Immigrant Families, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
391, 398–401 (2008);  Nina Bernstein, Report Says Immigration Agents Broke Laws and Agency 
Rules in Home Raids, N.Y. TIMES (Jul. 21, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/22/nyregion/
22raids.html [http://perma.cc/4XP4-QWQV]. 
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Under the Obama Administration residential raids have been scaled back 
in favor of new enforcement initiatives such as ICE’s Secure Communities 
partnership with local and state officials. This program allows ICE to place a 
detainer on non-citizens arrested by local and state law enforcement, leading to 
possible removal even if they are not convicted of the crime for which they 
were originally charged. Thirty-nine percent of persons apprehended through 
this initiative report that they have a U.S. citizen child or spouse.33 Through 
this and other enforcement initiatives, the deportation rate has increased to new 
highs under the Obama Administration.34 In response to a Freedom of Infor-
mation Act request, ICE reported that it deported 204,810 parents of citizen-
children between 2010 and 2012.35 Recent changes in enforcement strategies 
have not made mixed-status families any less susceptible to separation through 
the detention and removal of their parents.  
II. INTERIOR IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT AND ITS IMPACT ON ICE’S 
CITIZEN STAKEHOLDERS 
The U.S. government’s official characterization of deportation as a civil 
sanction rather than a criminal punishment has been subject to intensive judi-
cial and scholarly criticism since this justification was first offered by the Su-
preme Court in Fong Yue Ting v. United States.36 The justification of deporta-
tion as a civil sanction is controversial given the hardship that arises from an 
immigrant’s removal from the country. It also does not reflect arguments that 
citizens and officials have provided to justify increasing the severity and scope 
of immigration enforcement measures as authorized under the 1996 Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act.37 For these reasons, 
legal scholars working at the intersection of immigration and criminal law 
(crimmigration) argue that immigration detention and removal constitutes a 
form of punishment, and that detainees ought to be accorded criminal constitu-
tional protections.38 We agree on the latter point. 
                                                                                                                           
 33 AARTI KOHLI, PETER L. MARKOWITZ & LISA CHAVEZ, UNIV. CAL. BERKELEY SCH. L., 
SECURE COMMUNITIES BY THE NUMBERS: AN ANALYSIS OF DEMOGRAPHICS AND DUE PROCESS 5 
(2011). 
 34 See U.S. OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, DEP’T HOMELAND SEC., 2011 YEARBOOK OF 
IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 102 (2012). 
 35 Seth Freed Wessler, Primary Data: Deportations of Parents of U.S. Citizen Kids, COLORLINES 
(Dec. 17, 2012, 9:30 AM), http://www.colorlines.com/articles/primary-data-deportations-parents-us-
citizen-kids [http://perma.cc/EX5M-49L7]. 
 36 See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893). 
 37 See DANIEL KANSTROOM, AFTERMATH 28–42 (2012). 
 38 Juliet P. Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, in 
GOVERNING IMMIGRATION THROUGH CRIME 59, 69–73 (Julie A. Dowling & Jonathan Xavier Inda 
eds., 2013); DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION 15–20 (2007). 
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The severity of the consequences to the migrant arising from immigration 
detention and removal does not necessarily make detention and removal a form 
of punishment with a retributive purpose.39 Therefore, we need to understand 
why citizens and officials insist upon the detention and removal of unauthorized 
immigrants.40 What objectives do they hope to accomplish by doing so? What 
possible sanctions other than detention and deportation are available for ordinary 
status violators whose only offense was to enter the country unlawfully?  
The original legal justification for immigration enforcement through de-
tention and removal may be obsolete. Or it may fail to reflect the true risk that 
many unauthorized migrants and settlers in removal proceedings pose to the 
security of the nation and the welfare of local communities. An approach that 
was designed to respond to an immediate threat to the security of the nation is 
less applicable to the typical unauthorized immigrant parent of a citizen-child 
who has never transgressed any non-immigration related laws or community 
standards. Therefore, it is questionable whether the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) needs to detain an ordinary status violator in order to accom-
plish its stated objectives and mandate to all of its stakeholders.41 
Furthermore, U.S. courts continue to stand by their initial characterization 
of deportation or removal as a civil proceeding that has a remedial, non-punitive 
objective.42 Courts in most major destinations of immigration throughout the 
world share this perspective.43 We may acknowledge that we are dealing with a 
legal fiction that does not reflect current views on the severity of the alleged of-
fense in question. Additionally, this legal fiction does not do justice to the conse-
quences that are experienced by long-term settled immigrants and their families 
when they are detained and deported. As long as this doctrine is in place, it is 
important to understand the logic and implications of the Supreme Court’s doc-
trine and the government’s position. This information can then be used to hold 
the government accountable for how it chooses to enforce its immigration regu-
lations that affect ordinary status violators. 
                                                                                                                           
 39 See Robert Pauw, A New Look at Deportation as Punishment: Why at Least Some of the 
Constitution’s Criminal Procedure Protections Must Apply, 52 ADMIN. L. REV 305, 325–27 (2000). 
 40 See id.; Stumpf, supra note 38, at 67–69 (discussing the theory of membership in order to 
understand the enforcement of immigration law). 
 41 See TANGEMAN, supra note 29, at 3-1 to 3-6 (detailing the strategies and goals of the 
Department of Homeland Security in regards to detention and removal). 
 42 See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 365 (2010) (holding that “deportation is a particularly 
severe ‘penalty,’ but it is not, in a strict sense, a criminal sanction” (quoting Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. 
at 740)). 
 43 See Galina Cornelisse, Immigration Detention and the Territoriality of Universal Rights, in 
THE DEPORTATION REGIME: SOVEREIGNTY, SPACE, AND THE FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT 100, 120 
(Nicholas de Genova & Nathalie Peutz eds., 2010); Daniel Wilsher, The Administrative Detention of 
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Why should it matter to the Bureau of Immigration and Customs En-
forcement (ICE) or its political overseers if front-line enforcement officials and 
their state and local partners are overstepping their mission priorities by arrest-
ing large numbers of non-criminal aliens? More importantly, why should ICE 
and its local and state law enforcement partners change their strategy? After 
all, a large part of their mission is to remove unauthorized immigrants from the 
United States. However, even ICE has acknowledged that its authority is con-
strained by whether it fulfills its intended purpose on behalf of the stakeholders 
identified by Operation Endgame for whom immigration enforcement is in-
tended to serve. The internal legitimacy and effectiveness of ICE’s enforce-
ment operations as defined by Operation Endgame are predicated on the de-
velopment of “cooperative relationships and effective partnerships with our 
internal and external stakeholders” in order to “fulfill the demands of the Pres-
ident, the Congress and the American people.”44 This means coordinating en-
forcement priorities with the interests of “critical stakeholders” including law 
enforcement, community leaders, and U.S. Senators and Congressmen, which 
are not always consistent with or best served by maximizing arrests, detentions 
and removals. Also, becuase ICE defines immigrant rights groups, non-
citizens, and their families as stakeholders in the process, this means that ICE 
and its 287(g) partners have an interest in ensuring that the human and legal 
rights of migrants and their families are respected in any enforcement opera-
tion.45 This helps to ensure that the overall mission priorities are not compro-
mised by negative publicity, political pressure, or adverse litigation. 
III. IMMIGRATION POLICY CHANGES UNDER THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION 
In the absence of congressional action, the Obama Administration has 
taken an active role in setting priorities for the implementation of existing im-
migration policy. Some of these changes were designed to shift the priority 
from ordinary status violators whose only offense was entering the country 
unlawfully to non-citizens who have committed criminal offenses.  
The Obama administration has taken a number of steps to shift the priori-
ty of the United States’s immigration policy, using its discretionary power over 
the enforcement of legislative mandates to, in effect, institute its own immigra-
tion policy agenda that contains many progressive features. As early as 2009, 
the Obama Administration began to redirect enforcement efforts towards 
workplace enforcement. Further, in June 2011, the Bureau of Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement (ICE) Director John Morton issued a memo directing 
agents not to detain ordinary status violators who are disabled, elderly, preg-
nant, or nursing, or demonstrate that they are primary caretakers of children or 
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an infirm person, or whose detention is otherwise not in the public interest.46 
In June 2012, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Janet 
Napolitano issued a directive authorizing “deferred action for childhood arri-
vals” (DACA) allowing unauthorized immigrants to apply for status that 
would shield them from removal for two years.47 In January 2013, DHS also 
allowed non-citizens seeking to stay together with their citizen family mem-
bers to appeal the provision of the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Im-
migrant Responsibility Act that requires them to return to their country of 
origin for ten years prior to applying for an immigration benefit in the United 
States.48 In November 2013, the Obama Administration agreed to parole non-
citizen family members of citizen armed forces personnel while they are serv-
ing overseas.49  
At the same time, however, the enforcement arm of DHS remains com-
mitted to aggressive immigration enforcement tactics aimed at increasing the 
number of deportations. To this end, ICE reported a new record number of de-
portations every year during the Obama Administration, culminating in 
409,849 removals during fiscal year 2012.50 While the John Morton memo has 
shifted ICE’s enforcement priorities to emphasize the removal of criminal non-
citizens, the agency is still removing record numbers of ordinary status viola-
tors. To accomplish its deportation objectives, ICE continues to employ key 
elements of the “attrition through enforcement” strategy outlined by Kris Ko-
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bach, including new state and local partnerships (Secure Communities) and 
criminalizing and prosecuting unlawful entries (Operation Streamline). ICE 
continues to work with state and local partners that are implementing their own 
enforcement measures, even as the Obama Administration challenged Arizo-
na’s unilateral approach (SB 1070) in federal court.51 
A. Secure Communities 
Similar to the 287(g) agreements authorized under the Illegal Immigration 
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, the Secure Communities program 
relied on integrated databases and collaborations with local and state law en-
forcement to enhance domestic deportation capacity.52 The goals of Secure 
Communities were to: “1. Identify criminal aliens through modernized infor-
mation sharing . . . 2. Prioritize enforcement actions to ensure apprehension 
and removal of dangerous criminal aliens,” and “3. Transform criminal alien 
enforcement processes and systems to achieve lasting results.”53 But the scope 
and impact of Secure Communities on local policing is far more expansive 
than those of the 287(g) agreements. The 287(g) agreement model was volun-
tary and required the federal government and the subnational jurisdiction in 
question to agree on their terms of cooperation. The Secure Communities Pro-
gram was mandatory and nationwide in scope until it was replaced as part of 
the Obama Administration’s November 2014 Immigration Accountability Ex-
ecutive Actions with the Priority Enforcement Program.54   
Although Secure Communities was piloted in fourteen jurisdictions in the 
last months of the George W. Bush administration in 2008, the program was 
dramatically expanded under the Obama Administration. By January 2013, 
ICE reported that Secure Communities has been activated in all 3181 jurisdic-
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tions in the country.55 As of 2015, under the Priority Enforcement Program that 
replaced Secure Communities, ICE is continuing to build on its information 
sharing agreements that it initiated under the Secure Communities program to 
identify and detain aliens apprehended by local and state law enforcement 
agencies.56 For ICE, the success of the program is measured by the removal of 
convicted criminal aliens as a percentage of the total number of deportations. 
But even as the program approached full activation in 2012, 47.5%, or 
199,445, of the record 419,384 aliens removed in fiscal year 2012 had not been 
convicted of crimes.57  
The program has received considerable scrutiny from its state and local 
partners in part because ICE officials misrepresented who should be detained 
as well as what the program requires partnering law enforcement agencies to 
do.58 Moreover, ICE did not disseminate any rules regarding how states and 
local communities should administer the program’s implementation. Some 
state and local partners to the program have also criticized it because of its det-
rimental effects on community policing.59 In a June 2011 letter, Mary Heffer-
nan, the Massachusetts Secretary of Public Safety and Security, writing on be-
half of Massachusetts Governor Deval Patrick, informed the acting director of 
Secure Communities that Massachusetts would not be entering into a memo-
randum of agreement with ICE because  “residents . . . expressed concerns 
about racial profiling . . . law enforcement fears that the program is overbroad 
and may deter the reporting of criminal activity,” and the apprehensions of 
mayors that “the program will deteriorate relationships with communities that 
have been carefully cultivated with years of hard work.”60 New York and Illi-
nois also attempted to withdraw from Secure Communities in 2011.61 In re-
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sponse, ICE rescinded all of its joint agreements with state and local officials 
in August 2011 and proceeded to implement the program unilaterally with no 
provision for jurisdictions to opt-out.62  
In direct response to the criticism of the Secure Communities program by 
local and state law enforcement officials and the extent of their non-cooperation 
with the federal program, U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security Jeh Johnson an-
nounced that the Secure Communities program would be discontinued as of No-
vember 20, 2014.63 In the same memo, however, Johnson declared that the over-
arching goal of Secure Communities “remains in my view a valid and important 
law enforcement objective.”64 The successor to Secure Communities, the Priori-
ty Enforcement Program, still permits the FBI and ICE to check the fingerprints 
of every person arrested by local and state law enforcement officials.65 The Pri-
ority Enforcement Program is still being implemented, and it remains to be seen 
whether it will limit the number of deportations of individuals who were arrested 
but not convicted of crimes.66 Early evidence as of April 2015 suggests that, alt-
hough ICE has been requesting fewer detainers from local and state law en-
forcement agencies, more of the detainer requests have been placed on individu-
als who have not been convicted of serious crimes.67  
B. Operation Streamline 
Initiated by President George W. Bush and expanded by President 
Obama, Operation Streamline authorizes United States Customs and Border 
Patrol (USCBP) to file federal criminal charges against persons who entered 
the United States unlawfully.68 This includes first-time offenders who were 
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previously allowed to voluntarily depart the country without charges.69 Persons 
initially deported under Operation Streamline who are apprehended a second 
time can be charged with felony re-entry, an offense that, even without another 
criminal offense, carries a maximum sentence of two years.70 Though this pol-
icy mostly affects individuals apprehended at the border by the U.S. Border 
Patrol, United States Attorney’s Offices can also decide to charge unlawful 
entrants with criminal offenses rather than allowing immigration courts to han-
dle matters as a violation of administrative law.71 
The U.S. Marshals Service (USMS) is playing an increasing role in de-
taining people attempting to enter the United States without authorization. As 
statistics demonstrate, much of the growth in immigration detentions can be 
attributed to Operation Streamline. In 1994, USMS booked 8604 non-citizens 
on immigration charges. By 2011, the number of USMS immigration arrests 
rose to 84,313, representing an increase of 980% compared to a 211% increase 
(from 98,978 to 209,576) for all other offenses over the same time period. As 
with all other federal detainees facing criminal charges, individuals prosecuted 
because of Operation Streamline are held by USMS. In addition, those who are 
held for short periods for criminal immigration violations often complete their 
sentences under USMS custody.72 Between 2005 and 2011, the number of de-
tainees held by USMS and booked on immigration charges increased by 121%, 
compared to the eighty-one percent increase during the previous six-year peri-
od.73 Because of increased border security, the number of apprehensions by the 
USCBP decreased by about 72.7% (from about 1.2 million to 328,000) during 
the same period.74 Therefore, the evidence suggests that USMS’s enlarged de-
tainee population was a direct result of increased criminal arrests and prosecu-
tions rather than a rise in apprehensions by the USCBP. 
C. State Law Initiatives: Determinations of Immigrant Status 
The state law initiatives in Arizona serve as an example of the state law 
initiatives that have led to the spike in enforcement. On April 23, 2010, Arizo-
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na’s legislature enacted the Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighbor-
hoods Act, commonly known as SB 1070.75 Over the next year, state legisla-
tures in Georgia, Alabama, South Carolina, and Indiana enacted similar poli-
cies seeking to promote the self-deportation of unauthorized immigrants 
through pervasive local, state, and federal immigration policing.76 In addition, 
Utah pursued its own state immigration legislation that combined restrictive 
measures with authorization for a state guest worker program.77 As a policy 
entrepreneur, Kris Kobach authored and promoted the original Arizona meas-
ure as a centerpiece of his “attrition through enforcement” strategy to comple-
ment partnerships such as Secure Communities and criminalization efforts in-
cluding Operation Streamline.78 
Although SB 1070 contains features that reflect the purposes of 287(g) 
agreements, Secure Communities, and Operation Streamline, the state legisla-
tion and similar legislation in other states were introduced unilaterally without 
the cooperation of the federal government. Calvin Lewis has argued that the 
second section of SB 1070, which requires that law enforcement officers 
“make a reasonable attempt, when practicable, to determine an individual’s 
immigration status during the course of any police stop, detention or arrest” by 
checking with federal immigration enforcement authorities, is consistent with 
the objectives of the 287(g) agreements and Secure Communities.79 Section 3 
and Section 5 of SB 1070, which criminalize the failure to carry an alien regis-
tration document as well as the harboring of unauthorized immigrants, argua-
bly reflect the criminalization of immigration offenses in Operation Stream-
line.80 Further, SB 1070 also contains a provision (Section 6) requiring local 
and state law enforcement to unilaterally pursue actions that Arizona claims 
are not being adequately pursued by federal authorities, including authorizing 
officers to arrest persons suspected of unlawful presence.81  
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 The Obama Administration expressed concerns that state immigration 
enforcement measures would interfere with international relations. As a result, 
the Department of Justice brought suit, stating that SB 1070 superseded federal 
immigration law and enforcement priorities.82 On June 25, 2012, in Arizona v. 
United States, a five-member majority of the Supreme Court invalidated Sec-
tions 3, 5(C), and 6 of SB 1070 as preempted by federal immigration law.83 
However, the Court upheld the provision requiring state officers to “make a 
‘reasonable attempt . . . to determine the immigration status’ of any person they 
stop, detain and arrest,” because “Congress has obligated ICE to respond to 
any request made by state officials for verification of a person’s citizenship or 
immigration status.”84 The Court also justified this provision by stating that 
“[c]onsultation between federal and state officials is an important feature of the 
immigration system.”85 The Supreme Court’s ruling provides Arizona and oth-
er states with support to continue to assist the federal government with its goal 
of detaining and removing more unauthorized immigrants from the country. 
IV. LOBBYING ACTIVITIES 
The current corrections system provides significant monetary incentive 
for private corrections corporations—institutions that make more money with 
larger prison populations—to lobby state and federal officials to create policies 
that support a rising prison population and, as a result, expand privatization 
contracts.86 At a time when private prison companies are becoming further re-
liant on housing federal detainees, there is also a strong incentive to promote 
local and state immigration enforcement efforts that increase the number of 
non-citizen detainees. This focus on immigrant detainees is evidenced in the 
millions of dollars that private prison operators spent on federal lobbying fol-
lowing the creation of the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
(ICE) in 2003. 
The Corrections Corporation of America (CCA) is an example of how 
private corrections corporations can benefit from a spike in the prison popula-
tion, as well as how recent immigration enforcement policies have aided such 
corporations. The largest private prison operator that detains immigrants in the 
United States, CCA was on the verge of bankruptcy immediately prior to the 
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9/11 attacks.87 Today, CCA is a highly profitable company that has benefitted 
from the expansion of immigration enforcement and incarceration in the past 
decade. In its 2012 annual report to shareholders, the CCA reported that it de-
rived $206 million from its contracts with ICE for detaining immigrants, repre-
senting twelve percent of its total 2012 revenue of $1.75 billion.88 The same 
report warns shareholders that: 
We currently derive, and expect to continue to derive, a signifi-
cant portion of our revenues from a limited number of governmental 
agencies. The loss of, or a significant decrease in, business from the 
BOP, ICE, USMS, or various state agencies could seriously harm 
our financial condition and results of operations.89  
 The 2012 annual report also notes that immigration reform legislation 
leading to the legalization of unauthorized immigrants might have an impact 
on “demand for our facilities and services” and revenue resulting from a small 
number of government contracts. In particular, CCA warns shareholders that: 
For instance, any changes with respect to drugs and controlled 
substances or illegal immigration could affect the number of persons 
arrested, convicted, and sentenced, thereby potentially reducing de-
mand for correctional facilities to house them. Immigration reform 
laws are currently a focus for legislators and politicians at the feder-
al, state, and local level.90 
In 2013, in response to threats to its bottom line, CCA employed thirty-
seven federal lobbyists split between five different lobbying firms as well as its 
own in-house political advocacy team.91 Private prison companies are also ac-
tively contributing to the re-election campaigns of officials who introduced or 
supported harsh immigration laws at the state level. Campaign contribution 
data strongly suggests that CCA and the GEO Group (the second largest pri-
vate prison operator in the United States) actively shaped the creation of the 
anti-immigrant bill SB1070 in Arizona.92 Thirty of the thirty-seven sponsors of 
Arizona’s SB1070 received donations from prison lobbyists or private prison 
operators.93 CCA also contributed funds to five out of the seven sponsors of 
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Georgia’s state immigration enforcement law, HB 87.94 In total, the three larg-
est private prison operators, including CCA, GEO Group, and Management 
and Training Corporation, spent at least $45 million on campaign donations 
and lobbyists at the state and federal level from 2003 to 2012.95  
Private prison operators have shaped immigration enforcement legislation 
at the local and state levels to their advantage. They continue to lobby law-
makers at all levels of government to protect their financial interest in the ex-
pansion of local, state and federal immigration enforcement efforts that send 
more non-citizens to their detention facilities. 
V. IMPACT OF DETENTION AND REMOVAL ON IMMIGRANT FAMILIES 
Among the main reasons for the expansion of the immigration detention 
apparatus even before the events of September 11, 2011 was to close perceived 
loopholes in the enforcement of immigration laws that led to the mass settle-
ment of unauthorized immigrants in the United States. Federal immigration 
enforcement partnerships with local and state law enforcement, mandatory de-
tention, and expedited removal provisions were mostly implemented after 
2003. However, they were authorized under the 1996 Illegal Immigration Re-
form and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) signed into law by President 
Clinton. This measure grew out of frustration by policymakers that the 1986 
Immigration Reform and Control Act, which legalized three million unauthor-
ized immigrants and expanded workplace enforcement, failed to stem the 
growth of the unauthorized population.96 The 287(g) local-federal immigration 
enforcement partnerships expanded the reach of immigration enforcement in 
jurisdictions with a Memorandum of Agreement with the Bureau of Immigra-
tion and Customs Enforcement (ICE) following the implementation of the pro-
gram in 2002.97 
In addition to authorizing expanded enforcement initiatives, IIRIRA also 
limited the discretion of immigration adjudicators to release on humanitarian 
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grounds non-Mexicans apprehended at the border. This measure was designed to 
close a perceived escape clause whereby unauthorized immigrant families with 
young children could be released into the community instead of being subject to 
immediate detention or removal. IIRIRA also curtailed a practice whereby im-
migration judges could suspend the deportation of long-term unauthorized im-
migrant residents if this would cause hardship to citizen-children.98 This provi-
sion was meant to respond to the belief that unauthorized immigrant parents 
could gain immigration benefits simply by giving birth in the United States.99 
Together, IIRIRA’s mandatory detention, expedited removal, and the end of 
“suspension of deportation” decreased the likelihood that unauthorized immi-
grant parents could be released or could successfully appeal their removal. 
A. Impact on Unauthorized Immigrant Families 
On May 15, 2006, then-Assistant Secretary of ICE, Julie Myers, an-
nounced the opening of a new detention facility operated by the Corrections 
Corporation of America in Hutto, Texas.100 Under the Inter-Governmental Ser-
vice Agreement contract between Williamson County, Texas and the Depart-
ment of Homeland Security (DHS), the Corrections Corporation of America 
(CCA) was provided with $2.8 million dollars a month to house 512 detainees 
at the Hutto facility.101 In turn, CCA was tasked with housing “illegal alien 
families” apprehended while crossing the border or in the course of immigra-
tion raids, many of which apprehended immigrant families in their own homes 
and neighborhoods.102 The facility was also designed to close a gap in the im-
plementation of the “expedited removal” policy authorized under IIRIRA. This 
policy requires immigration authorities to detain every unauthorized migrant 
apprehended within 100 miles of the border for up to fourteen days after their 
entry.103 
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Before the creation of the DHS and the implementation of ICE’s Opera-
tion Endgame, unauthorized immigrant parents with young children were often 
released into the community with a “Notice to Appear” in immigration 
court.104 In ending the practice of supervised release on humanitarian grounds, 
Operation Endgame led to the separation of non-citizen parents and children 
subsequent to their detention.105 In this context, ICE Secretary Myers adver-
tised the new family detention center in humanitarian terms as a policy of “de-
terrence with dignity by allowing families to remain together, while sending 
the clear message that families entering the United States illegally will be re-
turned home.”106 
Over the next year, human rights groups that visited the prison found that 
CCA officials were operating the facility as a “medium-security prison.” The 
children housed there were treated as ordinary inmates by prison officials who 
ignored medical, educational and other welfare standards as required by Reno 
v. Flores.107 In response, the ACLU brought suit against then-DHS Secretary 
Michael Chertoff on behalf of sixteen children detained in Hutto. The lawsuit 
alleged that the CCA personnel operating Hutto on ICE’s behalf “show a pat-
tern of officially sanctioned behavior that . . . establish a credible threat of fu-
ture injury” to the children housed there, ranging from separating parents from 
children for misbehavior to the denial of medical care.108 After ICE settled 
with the ACLU in August 2007, children were guaranteed at least five hours of 
schooling a day and the right to wear their own clothing in their cells.109 Dur-
ing the first year of the Obama Administration, on August 6, 2009, ICE Assis-
tant Secretary John Morton announced plans to discontinue family detention at 
Hutto.110 But with a surge in new unauthorized immigration from Central 
America, ICE once again began to send immigrant families detained by Border 
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Patrol to private detention facilities in Texas on August 1, 2014, this time oper-
ated by the GEO Group in Karnes County.111 
B. Impact on Mixed-Citizenship Status Families 
Unlike the above discussed Hutto and Karnes detainees who were appre-
hended shortly after entering the United States, many immigrant families have 
lived in the United States for an extended period prior to their detention. Most 
unauthorized immigrants that are in the United States today have been in the 
United States since at least 2005.112 In March 2013, DHS released estimates 
that 9.89 million persons representing eighty-seven percent of the 11.43 mil-
lion unauthorized immigrants living in the United States as of January 2011 
entered before 2005.113 The Pew Hispanic Center estimates that 4.7 million 
unauthorized immigrants are the parents of minor children.114 A small percent-
age of these children were born abroad, but 4.5 million children who are citi-
zens because they were born in the United States have an unauthorized immi-
grant parent.115 
Having a citizen-child does not prevent immigration officials from detain-
ing or removing an unauthorized immigrant parent from the United States. Nor 
does it provide most applicants with a legal basis to appeal their detention or 
removal. Before 1996, United States immigration judges had expansive discre-
tionary powers to “suspend the deportation” of unauthorized immigrant parents 
residing in the United States for more than seven years based on their charac-
ter, hardship to their children, and other connections to the community.116 
IIRIRA curtailed this discretionary power, replacing it with a “cancellation of 
removal” provision limited to only 4000 applicants per year, which represents 
less than a tenth of a percent of the total number of unauthorized immigrant 
parents in the United States.117  
To be eligible for cancellation of removal, unauthorized immigrant par-
ents must prove that their citizen-children would suffer “exceptional and ex-
tremely unusual hardship” far exceeding the harm experienced by other fami-
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lies facing deportation.118 Under this standard, the Board of Immigration Ap-
peals (BIA) deemed that an applicant, Francisco Javier Monreal-Aguinaga, 
who resided in the United States from age fourteen to thirty-four, with a full-
time job, two school aged citizen-children who have never been to Mexico, 
and responsibility for caring for elderly parents as ineligible for relief from 
removal.119 In their decision, the majority acknowledged that Monreal-
Aguinaga’s children would suffer “extreme hardship” that would have been 
sufficient to justify allowing him to remain in the country under the pre-1996 
standard.120 
The U.S. born citizen-children of unauthorized immigrants have a consti-
tutional right to remain in the United States under a longstanding interpretation 
of the Fourteenth Amendment’s citizenship clause.121 However, minor citizen-
children cannot use this status as a basis for sponsoring their unauthorized par-
ents for immigration benefits, or for appealing their parents’ deportation or-
ders. In Acosta v. Gaffney, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the 
claim that a child’s right to enjoy the benefits of his or her citizenship is con-
tingent upon being able to remain in the United States under the care of his or 
her parents or guardians.122 Following this decision, an unauthorized immi-
grant mother and head of the civil rights group La Familia Latina Unida, Elv-
ira Arellano, initiated a high-profile challenge that was rejected in 2006.123 In 
both cases, the majority ruled that children did not lose their rights as citizens 
when their parents were deported because they could remain under the care of 
an alternative guardian or leave with their parents and then return as adults. 
According to this argument, parents facing deportation do not necessarily lose 
their parental rights because they have the choice to take their citizen-children 
with them or to leave them with a relative or guardian or in foster care. 
However, state family courts are now challenging even this limited paren-
tal right, declaring that unauthorized immigrants in immigration detention are 
unfit parents of their citizen-children. State courts have declared unauthorized 
immigrants that are detained to be unfit parents and stripped them of their pa-
rental rights.124 In areas where local law enforcement signed a 287(g) agree-
ment with ICE to enforce immigration laws at the local level, children in foster 
care were on average twenty-nine percent more likely to have an unauthorized 
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immigrant parent than in other counties.125 They are often detained hundreds of 
miles from their children in remote detention facilities, limiting access to legal 
counsel, family members, and immigrant assistance agencies. As a practical 
matter, parents who are in ICE custody or removed to a foreign country face 
insurmountable obstacles to challenging this decision regardless of the merits 
of their case. If no other U.S.-based relatives come forward to claim their citi-
zen-children, the children can become wards of the state.126   
Removing parents from their citizen-children can have a significant nega-
tive impact on the citizen-children. According to a study by the Applied Re-
search Center in 2011, an estimated 5100 citizen-children are in foster care as 
the result of their parents’ detention or removal from the United States.127 
Apart from parental rights considerations and the interests of children in re-
maining in their communities under the care of their parents, taxpayers are 
forced to bear the costs of raising citizen-children in foster care while the im-
migrant parents are detained. As a result, state interests may be harmed in the 
pursuit of the immediate perceived benefit to the state of removing deportable 
parents without exception.128 
CONCLUSION: TOWARDS ALTERNATIVES 
Changes in interior immigration enforcement priorities instituted by the 
Obama Administration under ICE Assistant Secretary John Morton in 2011 
were meant to shift the focus of enforcement away from ordinary status viola-
tors with U.S. citizen dependents and towards criminal aliens and national se-
curity threats. However, although the most highly publicized abuses at the 
hands of private corrections corporations were curtailed under the Obama Ad-
ministration, the number of ordinary status violators with citizen-children de-
tained and deported continues to rise. New initiatives such as Secure Commu-
nities and its successor, the Priority Enforcement Program, have broadened the 
reach of interior immigration enforcement into immigrant communities by re-
quiring all local law enforcement agencies to check the immigration status of 
every person arrested, even if they are not ultimately convicted. Thus, the 
problem that the Morton Memo was meant to address is still with us. Unau-
thorized immigrants whose only offense was entering the United States with-
out authorization are being detained and deported in record numbers, impact-
ing hundreds of thousands of citizen-dependents. Further, private corrections 
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corporations are continuing to benefit from the increase in detentions of ordi-
nary status violators at the expense of citizen stakeholders. 
We are not making a case for amnesty, or that interior immigration en-
forcement actions directed at ordinary status violators should cease outright to 
avoid hardship to them and their citizen family members. This article was lim-
ited to exposing ICE’s continued failure to redirect detention and deportation 
resources to national security threats and aliens convicted of serious criminal 
offenses. The article also suggests that a targeted enforcement strategy would 
be better served by pursuing alternatives to the detention of ordinary status 
violators. We are willing to accept that violations of United States immigration 
law, however minor, need to be accounted for. As a short-term solution, alter-
natives to detention subsequent to apprehension, such as community supervi-
sion and electronic monitoring, should be used whenever possible as a cost-
effective strategy to allow low-risk ordinary status violators to remain in their 
communities with their citizen-dependents.  
A 2013 report by the National Immigration Forum notes that it costs ICE 
a minimum of $159 a day to detain a non-citizen as compared to a maximum 
of seventeen dollars a day for alternatives to detention, which includes elec-
tronic monitoring and telephonic reporting of non-violent detainees released 
into the community.129 As a longer-term response, future research that takes 
citizen objections to unauthorized immigration seriously as crimes should con-
sider whether ordinary status violations warrant sanctions that crimmigration 
scholars insist are retributory, deterrent, and incapacitory.130 We suggest that a 
restorative justice approach requiring ordinary status violators to provide resti-
tution in their communities could effectively balance accountability for unlaw-
ful entry against the community’s interest in allowing them to remain in a pro-
ductive role as caregivers and workers. 
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